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POLICING THE POLICE: THE ROLE OF THE 
COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION∗
Steven Zeidman
 
∗∗
The New York City Criminal Courts Conference asked, “Are We 
Achieving Justice.”
 
1  Given that those courts contended with 
approximately 190,000 misdemeanor arrests in 2003, up from 130,000 in 
1993, the question is increasingly relevant and important.2
This Essay focuses on how, and whether, the component parts of the 
courtsjudges, court administrators, and prosecutorspromote justice by 
actively and critically monitoring or overseeing the police.
 
3
This is an especially timely inquiry.  While reported crime in New York 
  Police action 
triggers the courts’ and institutional players’ opportunities to influence 
justice.  After an accused is deposited at the door of the court, all 
components of the criminal justice system must carefully and rigorously 
inspect the underlying police activity.  It is time to ask whether anyone is 
carrying out this vital task. 
 
∗ This Essay is an addendum to the collection, “A Conference on New York City’s Criminal 
Courts,” which appeared in the Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. XXXI, No. 4.  The 
Conference was held October 18, 2003 and was hosted by New York County Lawyers’ 
Association and the Fordham University School of Law’s Louis Stein Center on Law and 
Ethics. 
∗∗ Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law; J.D., 1981, Duke University School of Law.  
For their encouragement, criticisms, and suggestions, I thank Mari Curbelo, Tom Klein, and 
Robert Mandelbaum.  I gratefully acknowledge as well the support of the Professional 
Development Committee at CUNY School of Law. 
 1. See generally Martha Rayner, Conference Report: New York City’s Criminal 
Courts: Are We Achieving Justice?, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023 (discussing the issues 
raised at the Criminal Courts Conference). 
 2. THESE NUMBERS CAME FROM THE NYS DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES 
WEBSITE.  DCJS IS THE OVERSEEING BODY FOR CRIM JUSTICE IN NYS.  I CHECKED THEIR 
WEBSITE AND IT SEEMS AS IF IT HAS CHANGED.  MISDEMEANOR INFO IS NO LONGER THERE.  I 
HAVE EMAILED THEM FOR THIS INFO AND EXPECT THEY WILL GET BACK TO ME QUICKLY VIA 
EMAIL.  IN FACT, JUST RECEIVED AN EMAIL FROM THEM CONFIRMING THOSE NUMBERS. 
 3. While defense attorneys are very much a piece of the puzzle, and are often a part of 
the problem, a detailed examination of the defense lawyer’s role is beyond the scope of this 
Essay. 
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City is at its lowest level in decades,4 the number of misdemeanor arrests 
has risen dramatically.5  As a result, criminal justice policy is increasingly 
revealed in the lower criminal court.6
Two factors are responsible for the explosion in misdemeanor arrests.  
First, during the term of Mayor David Dinkins, the “Safe Streets Safe City” 
initiative resulted in a marked expansion in the size of the New York City 
Police Department (“NYPD”).
 
7  More police officers created the potential 
for more arrests.8  Second, the influence of the “Broken Windows” theory 
and the advent of “quality-of-life” policing under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani 
unleashed that massive police force in such a way that encouraged 
misdemeanor arrests for relatively minor misconduct.9
 
 4. See, e.g., Michele McPhee, NYPD Crime-Crunching Patrol Hike is Back, DAILY 
NEWS, Jan. 13, 2004, at 1 (“[W]e ended 2003 with the lowest crime rate in New York City 
in four decades,” quoting New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg). 
 
 5. In 1983, there were 105,000 misdemeanor arrests in New York City, 85,000 less 
than in 2003.  SEE N.2 ABOVE – AWAITING THIS INFO FROM DCJS VIA EMAIL.  IN FACT, JUST 
RECEIVED AN EMAIL FROM THEM CONFIRMING THOSE NUMBERS. 
 6. In 1989, fifty percent of all New York City arrests were felonies.  See Freda F. 
Solomon, N.Y. City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc, The Impact of Quality-of-Life Policing, 
Research Brief No. 3, Aug. 2003, [hereinafter CJA Research Brief], available at 
http://cjareports.org/reports/brief2.pdf.  In 1998, that number dropped to one-third.  Id. 
 7. In 1991, the New York City Council and the state legislature approved the “Safe 
Streets, Safe City” program.  1991 N.Y. LAWS ch. 6 (McKinney 1991).  The centerpiece of 
“Safe Streets, Safe City” was the addition of several thousand police officers.  See Steven L. 
Myers, Mayor Says Crime Data Affirm Strategies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at 26 (stating 
that the program “raised taxes specifically to pay for the hiring of 6000 more police 
officers”). 
 8. Shortly after “Safe Streets, Safe City” was enacted, the Chief Administrator of the 
New York State Courts, Matthew T. Crosson, predicted an increase in court caseloads.  See 
Gary Spencer, Legislators Rule Out More Funds for Judiciary, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 1991, at 1; 
see also John J. Donohue, Understanding the Time Path of Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1423, 1432 (1998) (discussing the impact of the increase in the number of 
police officers on the drop in crime). 
 9. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social 
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order— 
Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292 (1998) (explaining how 
New York City’s quality-of-life policing, an order maintenance strategy that focused on 
minor misdemeanor offenses, was premised on the “Broken Windows” theory that “minor 
physical and social disorder, if left unattended in a neighborhood, causes serious crime”); 
George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders’ Views of the New 
York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1217, 1218-19 (1998) (the “Broken 
Windows” theory “argued that, just as a broken window left untended was a sign that 
nobody cares and leads to more and severe property damage, so disorderly conditions and 
behaviors left untended send a signal that nobody cares and results in citizen fear of crime, 
serious crime, and the ‘downward spiral of urban decay’” (quoting WESLEY SKOGAN, 
DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF URBAN DECAY IN AMERICAN 
NEIGHBORHOODS 84 (1990))); Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 
2000, at 24 (“Once the police began thinking of low-level public disorder not as a problem 
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The spike in misdemeanor arrests, especially for low-level offenses, is 
not the only warning sign that such cases demand careful examination.  The 
proliferation of DNA exonerations of previously convicted individuals 
provides incontrovertible proof that many defendants are actually innocent 
and/or wrongly convicted.10  The disparate impact of the present policing 
on people of color has also been well documented.  In 1999, the shooting of 
Amadou Diallo by four police officers focused attention on the behavior of 
the NYPD’s Street Crimes Unit (“SCU”).11  SCU was primarily concerned 
with finding illegal handguns.  In 1998, the year before the Diallo shooting, 
SCU reported stopping and frisking 27,061 people, of whom only 4647 
were arrested.  Put another way, nearly 22,000 people were mistakenly 
searched.12  After an exhaustive examination of the NYPD’s “stop and 
frisk”13 practices, the New York State Attorney General reported that 
blacks and Latinos disproportionately bore the brunt of this aggressive 
policing.14
 
to be addressed but as an opportunity to investigate more serious crime, the incentive to 
arrest citizens for relatively minor offenses dramatically increased.”); James Q. Wilson & 
George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar., 1982. 
  The New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board 
 10. See, e.g., JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 262-67 (2000); Alan Berlow, The 
wrong man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov., 1999; Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice 
and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635 (1999); Richard A. Rosen, Innocence & 
Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 65-78 (2003); Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, New Doubt 
Cast on Crime Testing in Houston Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A19 (DNA 
exoneration of man convicted of rape called into question the scientific evidence used to 
convict thousands).  For a discussion of the distinction between actual innocence and 
convictions obtained due to significant legal error see Daniel Givelber, Meaningless 
Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1317, 1346 (1997). 
 11. See Weekend of Progress in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1999, at A20. 
 12. Michael Cooper, Raids and Complaints Rise as City Draws on Drug Tips, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 26, 1998, at A1. 
 13. “Stop and frisk” refers to the practice condoned by the United States Supreme Court 
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  According to Terry, a police officer may stop someone 
if he reasonably suspects the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.  Id. at 23.  
The officer can frisk or “pat down” the person if he reasonably suspects he is in danger of 
physical injury.  Id. at 24. 
 14. Office of New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer, The New York City 
Police Department’s “Stop & Frisk” Practices: A Report to the People of the State of New 
York from the Office of the Attorney General, Dec. 1, 1999, at pt. 1, available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop_frisk/stop_frisk.html.  A draft report of the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights found that racial profiling accounted for much of 
the NYPD stop and frisk practices.  See, e.g., Kevin Flynn, Rights Panel Scolds Police on 
Race Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2000, at B1 (citing data from 1998 that showed that while 
blacks make up nine percent of the Staten Island population, fifty-one percent of those 
stopped and searched were black); see Jim Yardley, The Diallo Shooting: The Community In 
Two Minority Neighborhoods, Residents See a Pattern of Hostile Street Searches, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1999, at B3  (“The police consider the stop-and-frisk an essential tool in 
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(“CCRB”) examined NYPD “stop and frisk” activity by reviewing 
complaints filed by people who had been stopped on the street and frisked 
by a police officer.15  The CCRB found that “African-Americans were 
over-represented in this sample of street-stop complaints, while whites 
were underrepresented.”16
In January 2000, the NYPD implemented a narcotics enforcement 
initiative called “Operation Condor.”
 
17  Two months later, Patrick 
Dorismond was approached by an undercover Condor officer who asked 
him where he could buy marijuana.18  Somehow, after Mr. Dorismond 
“reacted angrily,” he was shot and killed.  In much the same way that the 
killing of Amadou Diallo prompted an inquiry into the policy and behavior 
of the SCU, the killing of Patrick Dorismond led to questions concerning 
Operation Condor.19  It soon became apparent that “75 percent of the 
arrests under [Condor] have been for misdemeanors or even lesser offenses, 
known as violations.”20  The focus on relatively minor crimes and 
violations, and the concomitant disproportionate impact on people of color, 
in many ways characterize the NYPD’s criminal justice policy of the past 
decade.21
 
reducing crime, arresting suspects and seizing illegal guns, but many residents in minority 
neighborhoods say it has become an indiscriminate method of harassment.”).  More 
recently, an examination of data from January through June 2003 revealed that almost 
eighty-three percent of those stopped and frisked were black or Latino.  Alice McQuillan, 
Say Blacks Targeted for Frisking, DAILY NEWS, June 18, 2003, at 6 (recognizing the depth 
of the problem of race-based searches and seizures, the United States Department of Justice 
issued Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies); see 
also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by 
Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, June 2003, available at 
http://pub.bna.com/cl/RacialProfiling.pdf. 
  In fact, one of the architects of the “Broken Windows” theory, 
 15. Civilian Complaint Review Bd., Street Stop Encounter Report: An Analysis of 
CCRB Complaints Resulting From the New York Police Department’s “Stop & Frisk” 
Practices, June 2001, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/stop.pdf. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Tina Kelley, Police Shooting Victim is Remembered and Mourned in Tears and 
Song, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2000, at B4. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Kevin Flynn, Shooting Raises Scrutiny of Police Antidrug Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
25, 2000, at A1. 
 21. See, e.g., Harcourt, supra note 9, at 299 (“[A] law enforcement strategy that 
emphasizes misdemeanor arrests has a disproportionate effect on minorities . . . .”); Joe 
Davidson, Is Zero Tolerance a Solution or a Problem?, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2004, at B1 
(“The fatal NYPD shootings of Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond . . . went hand-in-
hand with a war on crime that seemed to legitimize police abuse and racism.”); William K. 
Rashbaum, Falling Crime in New York Defies Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2002, at B1 
(noting that almost one million people were arrested for minor violations in the preceding 
eight years, and citing Professor Michael Jacobson of John Jay College of Criminal Justice 
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James Q. Wilson, observed presciently, and frighteningly, that the 
overwhelming desire to reduce crime might mean that “[y]oung black and 
Hispanic men will probably be stopped more often than older white Anglo 
males or women of any race.”22
The motivations for, and consequences of, the creation and 
implementation of these police strategies have been the subject of much 
analysis and debate.  Yet, what happens to those arrested pursuant to these 
strategies has been glaringly bereft of critical review.  What happens with 
these cases inside the walls of the criminal courts is a question that remains 
unanswered. 
 
Over twenty years ago, the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York issued a report bemoaning the lack of trials in the New York City 
Criminal Court.23  The report noted that only one-half of one percent of all 
misdemeanor cases went to trial in the preceding year.24  By all accounts, 
the situation is even more direthere are tens of thousands more 
misdemeanor cases, yet the trial rate is actually plummeting.25  In addition 
to the dearth of jury verdicts, there are also very few determinations of the 
constitutionality of the police officers’ probable cause to stop, search, and 
arrest.  The court does not even appear to keep records of the number of 
suppression hearings held, let alone the outcomes of those hearings.26
 
regarding the “fraying effect” such zero tolerance approaches have on relationships between 
police and minority citizens).  
  The 
 22. James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at 47.  
For Wilson, that was a fair price to pay in order to try and remove illegal guns from the 
street.  Id.  A recent study by the New York Criminal Justice Agency revealed yet another 
by-product of ramped up quality-of-life policingan increase in the arrests of older, chronic 
offenders with myriad social problems, and a similar upsurge with respect to minority 
youths, with no adult convictions, arrested for low-level drug offenses.  CJA Research Brief, 
supra note 6. 
 23. Criminal Courts Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Saving the 
Criminal Court: A Report on the Caseload Crisis and Absence of Trial Capacity in the 
Criminal Court of the City of New York 1983, at 18 [hereinafter Caseload Crisis]. 
 24. Id. at 3.  The report added bluntly: “If you tell people that several months went by 
recently in Brooklyn Criminal Court without a single person being tried for anything they 
will tell you, quite correctly, that you are talking about something which is not a court.”  Id. 
at 19 (emphasis in original). 
 25. State of N.Y., Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., Bureau of Justice Research and 
Innovation, Misdemeanor Arrests New York City (on file with author).  In fact, the New 
York City misdemeanor trial rate in 2003 was less than one third of one percent.  See id.  
The lack of trials appears to be a widespread phenomenon.  See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The 
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459-84 (2004); Gina Holland, As Plea Deals Mount, Jury 
Trials Diminish, SUNDAY REPUBLICAN, Aug. 8, 2004, at A3.  
 26. Telephone interviews with Alan J. Murphy, Chief Clerk, Manhattan Supreme Court, 
Criminal Branch (DATE), and Chester Mount, Director of Research and Technology, New 
York State Unified Court System, Office of Court Administration (DATE) [hereinafter 
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result is virtually unfettered, unchecked police activity and discretion.  
Once an officer makes an arrest, it is for all intents and purposes insulated 
from any meaningful challenge or review.27
The free reign given to the police is even more troubling when 
considered in light of the well-documented history of police misconduct 
and corruption in New York City.  In 1992, then New York City Mayor 
David N. Dinkins assembled the Mollen Commission in response to 
numerous and spreading allegations of drug dealing and corruption in 
several police precincts.
 
28  The Commission’s charge was “to investigate 
the nature and extent of corruption in the Department; to evaluate the 
Department’s procedures for preventing and detecting corruption; and to 
recommend changes and improvements in those procedures.”29  The 
creation of a Commission to investigate the NYPD has become something 
of a ritual in New York City.  One of the members of the Mollen 
Commission wrote about the “apparent twenty-year cycles of police 
corruption scandals.”30  The Commission itself observed that “[f]or the past 
century, police corruption scandals in New York City have run in a regular 
twenty-year cycle of scandal, reform, backslide, and fresh scandal.”31
 
Telephone Interviews].   
  
Indeed, the recent arrest and indictment of an NYPD detective and his 
 27. In addition, the accused can not realistically turn to the appellate courts for redress.  
As a study of the New York Court of Appeals concluded, “Criminal defendants have little 
hope of being heard by the Court on the merits of their claim, and those chosen few who do 
get heard lose their cases in overwhelming numbers.”  Norman A. Olch, Soft on Crime? Not 
the New York Court of Appeals, N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1996, at 1; see John Caher, Court Grants 
Record Low Criminal Appeals; Convictions Affirmed in 1999 Reach 76 Percent, N.Y.L.J., 
May 16, 2000, at 1 (“[T]he odds of a criminal convict getting his or her case before the 
Court of Appeals are low and declining, while the chances of getting before the Court and 
prevailing are reed-slim.”); Gary Spencer, Report Shows Court of Appeals Sheds Caseload, 
with 198 Decisions in 1998, N.Y.L.J., June 2, 1999, at 1 (discussing the Court’s “continuing 
reluctance in criminal cases to grant defendants leave to appeal”).  The reversal rate in 
criminal appeals is also plummeting in the intermediate appellate courts.  See, e.g., John 
Caher et al., Appellate Panels See Their Influence Rise; Tribunals Take on Role of Court of 
Last Resort, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 2001, at 1. 
 28. See, e.g.,  James C. McKinley, Jr., Dinkins Names Police Corruption Panel and 
Urges Civilian Police Review, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at A1 (reporting on Dinkins’s 
appointment of a five member anti-corruption panel, headed by former Deputy Mayor for 
Public Safety, Milton Mollen). 
 29. Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption 
Procedures of the Police Dep’t, City of New York, Commission Report 1994, at 11 
[hereinafter Mollen Report], available at http://www.parc.info/reports/pdf/mollenreport.pdf. 
 30. J. Harold Baer, Jr., Symposium Speeches: The Mollen Commission and Beyond, 40 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 5, 5 (1995). 
 31. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 148 (documenting 100 years of NYPD corruption 
scandals); see also Clifford Krauss, Corruption in Uniform: The Long View; Bad Apple 
Shake-Ups: A 20-Year Police Cycle, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at B2. 
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retired partner has all the hallmarks of the behavior that precipitated the 
assembling of the Mollen Commission and other similar commissions.32
As one considers the myriad reasons why police misconduct so regularly 
reoccurs, it is necessary to consider the typical responses to it.  As the story 
of corruption begins to unfold, the airwaves become replete with 
prosecutors vowing full and thorough investigations and promising to bring 
the full force of the law to bear.
 
33  In the scandal’s wake comes the usual 
hand-wringing and calls for revamping the Police Department and creating 
independent police review boards.34  Inevitably, the ensuing wrangling 
between those who favor and those who oppose such oversight deflects 
attention from the underlying issuehow best to police police 
corruption.35
My focus is on a particular type of corruptionwhat the Mollen 
Commission termed “falsifications.”
  Surely there are a multitude of reasons why the problem 
persists, but it is time to look critically at the responses of the legal 
system’s institutional playersparticularly, the courts and the prosecutors. 
36  The Mollen Commission divided 
this type of corruption into three categories: “testimonial perjury, as when 
an officer testifies falsely under oath . . . ; documentary perjury, as when an 
officer swears falsely under oath in an affidavit or criminal complaint; and 
falsification of police records, as when an officer falsifies the facts and 
circumstances of an arrest in police reports.”37
 
 32. See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum, A Widening Inquiry Focuses on Officers Tied to 
Drug Money, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at A1 (referring to the investigation as “the 
biggest police corruption case in a decade”).  The prevalence of widespread and entrenched 
police corruption is by no means limited to New York City.  See, e.g., Charles Rappleye, 
Another Rupture in the LAPD’s Thin Blue Line, NEWSDAY, Oct. 10, 1999, at B4.  The 
corruption uncovered a few years ago in the Los Angeles Police Department rivals what 
occurred in New York.  Id.  A police officer was arrested for stealing cocaine from an 
evidence locker, and in exchange for leniency he revealed rampant misconduct in the 
Department’s Rampart Division.  Id.  One result was the formation of the Los Angeles 
Police Commission.  Id.  Coincidentally, Los Angeles had convened another police 
commission, the Christopher Commission, just a few years earlier in the aftermath of the 
brutal beating of Rodney King.  See Joe Domanick, Law Enforcement; Civilian Control of 
LAPD Is Elusive Despite Reforms, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1999, at M1. 
  Not only do these 
“falsifications” directly impact the courts, but, according to the 
Commission, they are “probably the most common form of police 
 33. See, e.g., Break the Police Corruption Cycle, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at A26 
(“The city needs an outside force, whether an independent special prosecutor or the 
investigatory commission recommended by M. Mollen to take over in the fight against 
corruption.”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 36. 
 37. Id. 
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corruption facing the criminal justice system.”38  In fact, the Commission 
found that the police practice of falsification was so prevalent in some 
precincts that it generated its own term “testilying.”39  These findings are 
not revelations.  The belief that police falsification is ubiquitous is widely 
held.40
What, then, have been the responses to this sweeping indictment?  How 
has the judiciary responded to the revelation that some percentage of police 
officers were testifying falsely in their courts, swearing falsely to criminal 
complaints, and/or falsifying police reports? 
 
Testimonial perjuryfalse testimony under oathrears its head 
particularly in suppression hearings.41  The Mollen Commission found that 
corrupt officers “manufactured facts” to justify unlawful searches and 
arrests.42  According to the Commission, “a common tale was the person 
dropped a bag . . . as the officers approached.”43  This so-called “dropsy” 
testimony, designed to overcome any constitutional objection to the police 
activity, is not new.  In People v. McMurty,44 Criminal Court Judge Irving 
Younger discussed the sudden emergence of “dropsy” testimony, and 
observed that it was only after the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary 
rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio45
 
 38. Id.  A recent study found that perjury by police officers was among the leading 
causes of wrongful convictions.  See Adam Liptak, Study Suspects Thousands of False 
Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at A15. 
 that he heard police officers testify that 
 39. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 36.  Some have similarly referred to the police 
practice of falsifying reports as “reportilying.”  See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: 
Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1996). 
 40. See, e.g., Carol A. Chase, Policing the Criminal Justice System: Rampart: A Crying 
Need to Restore Police Accountability, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 767, 769 (2001) (commenting 
that “[i]t has long been apparent that police officers testify untruthfully to avoid detection of 
their misconduct”); Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1312 
(1994) (explaining that “[t]he empirical studies on the subject suggest that perjured 
testimony is common, particularly in drug prosecutions”); Alan Dershowitz, Is Legal Ethics 
Asking the Right Questions, 1 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETHICS 15, 16 (1996) (“The Mollen 
Commission, the Knapp Commission, every commission that has studied the problem of 
police perjury, has in my view seriously understated the problem and yet has come to the 
conclusion that police perjury is rampant.”); Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, 
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, 42 (Summer/Fall 1982) (arguing that police perjury is “systemic”). 
 41. The Mollen Commission noted that police falsification was most prevalent in cases 
involving possessory offenses, especially narcotics and guns.  Mollen Report, supra note 29, 
at 36; see also Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of 
Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 248 
(1998); Slobogin, supra note 39, at 1043 (“[T]he most common venue for testilying is the 
suppression hearing . . . .”). 
 42. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 37. 
 43. Id. 
 44. 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Crim. Ct. 1970). 
 45. 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also Lewis Katz, Mapp After Forty Years: Its Impact on 
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defendants dropped drugs as the police approached.46  The logic behind 
“dropsy” testimony is simpleif the defendant dropped the evidence then 
there is no search to complain of.  One study of pre- and post-Mapp cases 
raised similar issues of police perjury, and concluded that “police are lying 
about the circumstances of such arrests so that the contraband . . . will be 
admissible.”47  Judge Younger urged over thirty years ago that “dropsy” 
testimony “should be scrutinized with especial caution.”48
So then, what happens at hearings when police officers espouse 
“dropsy” testimony or manufacture other facts to justify illegal searches?
 
49  
Are lying police officers caught by judges presiding over suppression 
hearings?  Although there is no hard data,50
Searches reveal precious few cases where evidence was suppressed 
based on testimonial perjury.  Given the Mollen Commission’s finding that 
it is part of the most common form of corruption facing the criminal justice 
system,
 the anecdotal evidence 
indicates that police officers “testily” with relative impunity. 
51 and the recognition that police perjury is indeed a widespread 
problem,52 this is worrisome, to say the least.  Ironically, rather than 
subjecting police testimony to some form of heightened scrutiny, especially 
regarding dropsy cases, it appears that courts imbue police testimony with 
heightened credence.  As the Mollen Commission concluded, “In short, the 
tolerance the criminal justice system exhibits takes the form of a lesser 
level of scrutiny when it comes to police officers’ testimony.  Fewer 
questions are asked; weaker explanations are accepted.”53
 
Race in America, 52 CASE W. RES. 471, 482 (2001) (“The impact of Mapp was naturally 
greatest in the African-American community where Fourth Amendment violations were the 
most common.  Whatever limited effect Mapp would have, it would be felt most where 
police conduct was the least restrained.”). 
 
 46. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 196. 
 47. Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: 
Manhattan Police Practices 1960-62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549, 549-50 (1968). 
 48. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 197. 
 49. The Mollen Commission also noted many other “manufactured tales.”  Mollen 
Report, supra note 29, at 38 (“To conceal an unlawful search of an individual who officers 
believe is carrying drugs or a gun, they will falsely assert that they saw a bulge in the 
person’s pocket or saw drugs and money changing hands.”). 
 50. See Telephone Interviews, supra note 26. 
 51. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 38. 
 52. See Skolnick, supra note 40, at 42 (explaining that police perjury is systemic). 
 53. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 42.  This finding is especially troubling in the 
context of dropsy testimony.  Not only did Judge Younger urge that such testimony be 
viewed with a jaundiced eye, but less than one year later, in People v. Berrios, 270 N.E.2d 
709 (N.Y. 1971), the District Attorney of Manhattan expressed his concern regarding police 
perjury and “dropsy” cases.  Remarkably, the District Attorney joined the defense in urging 
the court to hold that in dropsy cases the prosecution should shoulder the ultimate burden of 
proof to establish the reasonableness of the warrantless search.  The District Attorney’s brief 
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The language used in the few opinions where evidence was suppressed 
based on apparent police falsification is also telling.  The courts’ choice of 
words seems to reflect deliberate efforts to avoid calling police officers 
“liars.”54  Typically, the opinion states that the officer’s testimony was 
“tailored to nullify constitutional objection.”55  Even in those cases where 
the courts use harsher language, they steer clear from calling the officer a 
liar or perjurer.56
One might imagine, given the rarity with which police officers are 
deemed incredible, that those select few officers would be subject to dire 
consequences.  The NYPD, however, has shown little interest in policing 
falsifications.
 
57  While disappointing, to say the least, it is not unexpected.  
Ever since there have been police departments, much has been written 
about the unwillingness and inability of the police to police itself.58
 
stated, “For the last ten years participants in the system of justicejudges, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys and police officialshave privately and publicly expressed the belief that 
in some substantial but indeterminable percentage of dropsy cases, the testimony . . . is 
tailored to meet the requirements of search-and-seizure rulings.”  Id. at 714 (Fuld, C.J., 
dissenting).  The court, however, declined to switch the burden of proof.  Id. at 713. 
  Trial 
 54. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 40, at 1323-24 (“Judges simply do not like to call other 
government officials liarsespecially those who appear regularly in court.”); David N. 
Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 470-71 
(1999) (“[A] scathing opinion impugning the motives, honesty, or competency of police is 
rarely found in trial court opinions.”).  
 55. See, e.g., People v. Garofalo, 353 N.Y.S.2d 500 (App. Div. 1974); People v. Aquiar, 
No. 51140(U), Slip Op. (N.Y. Co. Ct. Feb. 13, 2003); People v. Brown, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 
2002 (Bx. Sup. Ct.) (Globerman, J.); People v. Curanovic, N.Y.L.J., May 2, 2003 (Bx. Sup. 
Ct).  
 56. See, e.g., People v. Cassidy, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 23, 1993 (Kings Sup. Ct.) (“The 
frequency of these farcical stories about how the arrest is made, can only lead to the 
conclusion that somewhere in the system, someone is telling young police officers what to 
say, irrespective of what actually happened in the street.”); People v. Martinez, N.Y.L.J., 
Mar. 20, 1992 (Kings Sup. Ct.) (Meyerson, J.) (“The Court finds the testimony of the . . . 
Police witnesses to be factually unclear and unreliable.”); People v. Acosta, N.Y.L.J., June 
25, 1991 (Bx. Sup. Ct.) (referring to “obvious flaws in the officer’s testimony and its 
inherent unbelievability,” and stating that “obvious attempts by police to circumvent our 
basic fourth amendment freedoms . . . will not be tolerated”); People v. Akwa, 573 N.Y.S.2d 
216, 217 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (“Based upon the glaring inconsistencies revealed in his testimony, 
and upon the manifestly false explanations he manufactured to account for them, I find his 
testimony unworthy of belief); People v. Fairley, N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1990 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.) 
(“Particularly disturbing to this Court is the willingness of the enforcer of our laws to distort 
the truth to justify his ends.”). 
 57. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 41 (noting that “supervisors were rarely, if ever, 
held accountable for the falsifications of their subordinates” and that there was not “a single, 
self-initiated Internal Affairs Division investigation into patterns of police perjury”); Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting) (“[w]ith rare exceptions law enforcement agencies do not impose direct 
sanctions on the individual officer” when evidence is suppressed). 
 58. See, e.g., Don’t Veto the Police Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1994, at A18; 
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judges, who observe the witness swear to tell the truth and then willingly, 
brazenly, and publicly violate that oath, occupy another position entirely.  
And, no matter how gently and carefully it is labeled, a finding of police 
incredibility is another way of saying that the officer committed a 
crimeperjury.59
Are judges aware of the problem of police testimonial perjury?  One 
judge in New York City candidly admitted as much: “Few have not been 
troubled by police testimony obviously tailored or patently false.”
  Contrast a case where evidence is suppressed because of 
police perjury with one where evidence is suppressed because the officer, 
while testifying truthfully, did not have the requisite quantum of 
information to support his actions.  While both result in “illegal” or 
“unlawful” searches, the one predicated on perjury is “illegal” in the truest 
sense of the word.  Yet, judges by and large do not refer these cases to the 
appropriate law enforcement authorities. 
60  One 
commentator observed that the “regular participants in the criminal justice 
system”judges includedall know that police officers commit perjury.61  
Perhaps, while judges may acknowledge the existence of police perjury 
generally, it is an altogether different proposition to discern and label it in a 
particular case.  This may be especially true when dealing with a 
professional, experienced police officer witness.62
Yet, we are told that perjury exists, and so it must be discovered.  
Instead of accepting police testimony as truthful, judges should be skeptical 
and scrutinize the testimony in the way suggested by Judge Younger thirty-
five years ago.
 
63  They should listen carefully for catch phrases designed to 
justify warrantless searches.64  One judge has suggested that to overcome 
police fabrications judges must also take a more active role in determining 
the facts.65
 
Mark H. Moore & David M. Kennedy, N.Y.P.D. Clean, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1994, at A19; 
Mr. Giuliani’s Police Ploy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at 18; The Case for a Police Monitor, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2000, at 18. 
  In that case, the judge ordered a crime scene visit to verify 
 59. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210 (McKinney 2003). 
 60. People v. Diaz, 625 N.Y.S.2d 388, 397 (Bx. Sup. Ct. 1994). 
 61. Cloud, supra note 40, at 1311-12. 
 62. Id. at 1321-22 (noting that judges often accept perjury because it is difficult to 
determine if a police officer is lying, particularly if he is an experienced witness). 
 63. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Unnerving the Judges: Judicial Responsibility for the 
Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 787, 790 (2001) (“[J]udges unwittingly participate 
in police perjury and misconduct by not critically examining police credibility . . . .”). 
 64. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 37-38.  The Mollen Report refers to police 
fabricating probable cause by relying on legal language such as “hot pursuit” or “plain 
view.”  Id. 
 65. Diaz, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 390. 
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independently the testimony’s credibility and accuracy.66
What, then, about those exceptional cases where judges do find the 
police witness to be incredible?  Given how rare it is for a judge to make 
such a finding, one imagines that the offending officer’s testimony must 
have been beyond the pale.  Surely in those cases the judges refer the 
perjurer to the appropriate NYPD and prosecutorial authorities.  
Apparently, even in cases finding testimonial falsification, judges are loath 
to report the “testilier” to the appropriate authorities.
  Perhaps above 
all, judges must be willing to find and state that a police officer has 
committed perjury. 
67
No doubt, part of the judicial reluctance is grounded in concerns of 
certaintyhow sure should a judge be before referring a police officer for 
investigation?  The standards that govern prosecutors are illuminating.  
Prosecutors are advised to file charges if there is probable cause to believe 
the defendant committed the crime.
 
68  One scholar suggests that 
prosecutors actually need only a “fair possibility” of guilt in order to 
commence a prosecution.69
 
 66. Id. at 393. 
  It stretches credulity to imagine that a judge 
finding that an officer had tailored his testimony to overcome constitutional 
requirements would not concomitantly have probable cause, or a fair 
possibility, to believe the officer committed perjury.  Judges must strive to 
 67. See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 63, at 794. 
[T]here has been a failure by judges who have witnessed police perjury to take 
meaningful action to prevent such misconduct in the future.  A judge’s standard 
course of action when an officer has lied is to dismiss the case or grant a motion to 
suppress, and ask the prosecutors to report the misconduct to appropriate police 
internal affairs authorities.  There is no follow-up by the court, no judicial 
reporting of the misconduct, no contempt orders, and no tracking of the problem 
officers. 
Id.  A judge in California recently spelled out her inner conflict as she declined to go after 
officers she suspected of having testified falsely in her courtroom.  Katherine Mader, 
Conundrum: How Should a Judge Act if She Suspects Two Police Officers Have Testified 
Falsely, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at 10. 
 68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2002). 
 69. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1588 
(2003).  Green argues that Model Rule 3.8(a), dealing with the decision whether to 
prosecute, is a standard “that is both too low and incomplete.”  Id.  In another article, Green 
observed that “most commentators would agree that a prosecutor should not bring charges 
unless she has some degree of confidence that the person charged is in fact guiltyalthough 
there is disagreement about how much confidence is needed.”  Bruce A. Green & Fred C. 
Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 843 n.25 (2004).  Several 
commentators have argued that prosecutors should be personally convinced of the 
defendant’s guilt.  See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 339-42 (2001); John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial DiscretionA 
Comment, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 174, 178 (1965-66). 
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uncover perjury, and, when they do root it out, they must not let their 
findings go unnoticed.   
For all the varieties of police falsification, perhaps the most revealing 
was the practice of “trading collars.”70
In one precinct we investigated, a cooperating officer told us of a regular 
pattern of “trading collars.”  The purpose of this practice was to 
accumulate overtime pay for the officers involved.  In the scheme, the 
police officer who actually arrested the defendant would pass off the 
arrest to a colleague who was not involved or even present at the time of 
the arrest.  Trading collars was done to maximize the overtime pay 
because the regular day off of the officer taking the arrest coincided with 
the likeliest date for a required court appearance.  The officer who took 
the arrest would get all the details from the actual arresting officer, fill out 
the arrest papers, interview with the District Attorney, and, if necessary, 
testify to the circumstances of the arrest.
  Not content to exaggerate or lie 
about what they did or did not do during the arrest, in this recurring 
scenario police officers testified about events that occurred when they were 
not even present: 
71
The critical question is what has the judiciary done post-Mollen 
Commission to make sure it is able to ferret out perjury, and that it never 
again becomes a complicit or unwitting participant in police falsifications.  
How have judges responded to the embarrassing and terrifying revelation 
that they were being duped in many cases?  What has the Criminal Court 
done in response to the clarion call for judicial oversight of the Police 
Department?  Can it be that all the judiciary is doing is relying on the 
NYPD to better police itself?  How many more scandals must there be 
before the court changes the way it does business?  The problem persists 
because police officers have learned since time immemorial that they can 
get away with it.  It is time for the judiciary to look itself in the mirror and 
acknowledge its role, however unintentional, in the police falsifications 
unearthed by the Mollen Commission.
 
72
 
 70. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 39. 
  “Testiliers” correctly learned that 
 71. Id. at 39-40; see also Joe Sexton, Types of Perjury Common Among Police Officers 
Are Detailed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1994, at 27. 
They are called “turnover arrests.”  A police officer arrests a suspect but has plans 
for the weekend and doesn’t want to spend the next day in court.  So he asks his 
partner not only to take credit for the arrest, but to take the witness stand in front 
of the grand jury as well.  As mundane as the motivation is, the resulting 
testimony nevertheless amounts to perjury. 
 72. See Dershowitz, supra note 40, at 23. 
The time has come for the courts to understand that they are a serious part of the 
problem . . . .  Judges at every level of every court.  Judges who are the ones who 
say they believe [the perjury].  The appellate judges who say we believe the 
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their lies would be credited, or, even if not, that they would not suffer any 
ill consequences.73
There are other ways the judiciary can more effectively combat police 
falsifications.  It is well past time for the judiciary to reconsider the use of 
the guilty plea, especially the guilty plea early in the proceedings, as the 
engine that drives the Criminal Court.  For too long, police corruption has 
been buried under an avalanche of guilty pleas: 
 
A large part of the problem is that once officers falsify the basis for an 
arrest, search, or other action in a Department recordsuch as an arrest 
report, complaint report, search warrant application, or evidence 
voucherto avoid Departmental or criminal charges, they must stick to 
their story even under oath when swearing to a criminal complaint or 
giving testimony before a trial jury.  But officers know that the operation 
of the criminal justice system itself usually protects them from having to 
commit testimonial perjury before a grand jury or at trial.  The vast 
majority of charges for narcotics or weapons possession crimes result in 
pleas without the necessity of grand jury or trial testimony, thus obviating 
officers’ concerns about the risk of detection and possible exposure to 
criminal charges of perjury.74
 
judges who said they believe it.  
 
Id.; Dorfman, supra note 54, at 465 (“One of the strongest reasons that police lie in court is 
the simple fact that judges allow them to get away with it.”); Levenson, supra note 63, at 
788 (“[J]udges must accept some responsibility for the Rampart scandal . . . .”). 
 73. Chase, supra note 40, at 769 (“In all but the most egregious of cases . . . a police 
officer faces no direct consequences of his or her violation.”); see Mollen Report, supra note 
29, at 36 (“The challenge we face in combating police falsifications, is not only to prevent 
the underlying wrongdoing that spawns police falsifications but to eliminate the tolerance 
the Department and the criminal justice system exhibit about police who fail to tell the 
truth.”); Levenson, supra note 63, at 791 (“One can only assume that the officers who lied 
in the Rampart scandal felt emboldened to do so because they knew they could get away 
with it.”); Slobogin, supra note 39, at 1045 (arguing that police perjury persists because 
“police think they can get away with it”).  
 74. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 36-37. 
Trials put official behavior on public display; professionalism is reinforced and 
sloppy, dishonest or abusive conduct is exposed for correction.  When it is 
extremely unlikely that a hearing or trial will ever examine the propriety of their 
conduct or the truthfulness of what they say, police officers inevitably become 
less concerned with how they make their arrests, conduct searches and treat 
defendants. 
Caseload Crisis, supra note 23, at 15; see also Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System 
of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2146 (1998) (“fully-adjudicated cases may 
be too rare to serve as a meaningful check on the executive authorities,” and there are “too 
few misdemeanor trials to serve as an effective appeals process to regulate prosecutorial 
decisions”).  The lack of trials is endemic to criminal justice systems.  See, e.g., Stephanos 
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2466 n.9 
(2004) (noting that in 2000, about ninety-five percent of felony convictions in state courts 
were the result of guilty pleas). 
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The high volume of pleas at arraignments75 is especially alarming given 
that the defense lawyer has just met the client and has not yet investigated 
and researched the facts and law of the case.76  The threat of pretrial 
detention causes many defendants to strike a Faustian bargainrather than 
contest the charges, they plead guilty in exchange for their freedom.  In the 
words of one authority on the Criminal Court, “Judges may, especially in 
misdemeanor cases, set bail at a level they expect is too great for the 
defendant to make, and then indicate to the defendant that were he to plead 
guilty the sentence would be time served and he’d be released from 
custody.”77
To best perform their justice-seeking mission, judges should encourage 
meaningful examinations of the facts and circumstances of the arrest.  
Presently, it is commonplace for judges to revoke plea offers if the 
defendant insists on a pretrial suppression hearing.  It is also typically the 
case that a conviction after trial results in a sentence substantially higher 
than that attached to a guilty plea offer.
 
78
It may well be the case that transformation of the judicial reliance on 
guilty pleas, especially at the accused’s initial court appearance, is also 
mandated by judicial ethics codes.  According to the American Bar 
  The predictable result is a slew 
of guilty pleas that serve to insulate police practice from scrutiny. 
 
 75. In July-December 2003, nearly half of all cases arraigned in New York City 
Criminal Court were disposed of at arraignment.  Guilty pleas accounted for almost two-
thirds of those dispositions.  N.Y. City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc., Annual Report 2003, 
at 16. 
 76. Pleas at arraignments fly directly in the face of the lawyer’s constitutional and 
ethical duty to investigate.  The American Bar Association Standards that govern defense 
attorneys provide that defense counsel should “conduct a prompt investigation of the 
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of 
the case. . .,” and “[u]nder no circumstances should defense counsel recommend to a 
defendant acceptance of a plea unless a full investigation . . . has been completed.”  ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 4-
4.1, 4-6.1 (1980). 
 77. Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining 
Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1382 (2004); see also Bibas, supra note 74, at 2491-93. 
 78. See, e.g., MALCOLM C. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT—HANDLING 
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 197 (1979); Levenson, supra note 63, at 792. 
[W]ittingly or not, judges provide the additional hammer prosecutors and police 
officers need to coerce defendants to forego trial and their right to challenge the 
evidence.  When judges routinely impose maximum sentences on those who go to 
trial, and much more lenient sentences on those who do not, the message to 
defendants is that there is a devastating cost to exercise their Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair trial. 
Id.; Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Centered 
Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 886 n.285 (1998).  
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Association Standards, judges are charged with “safeguarding the rights of 
the accused.”79  Surely, the accused’s right to a jury trial and to be free 
from unlawful searches and seizures falls within the ambit of that 
admonition.80  Judges must actively “safeguard” the defendant’s rights.  In 
other contexts, commentators have called on the judiciary to play a more 
active role to ensure that all litigants have access to justice.81  The notion of 
judges as active participants is not far-fetched.  The advent of problem-
solving courts has spawned a new way of thinking about a judge’s role in 
court proceedings.  Problem-solving judges are asked to take on a more 
participatory, active role in the resolution of the cases in their courts.82
In a related context, it is not uncommon these days for judges to make 
themselves heard regarding their critical views about existing laws.
 
83  
Some have even suggested that organizations of judges should lobby 
against unfair laws, or, at a minimum, take a public stance.84
In a similar vein, judges should recognize and acknowledge the 
importance of suppression hearings when considering a defense motion to 
suppress evidence.  If those hearings are the place where police 
falsification is most likely to rear its head,
 
85
 
 79. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL 
FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 6-1.1 (3d ed. 2000). 
 then it behooves the court to 
hold more, not fewer, suppression hearings.  One would think that the 
publicized recognition about the disproportionate impact of present 
policing policies on people of color, and the increasing acknowledgement 
that many are wrongly convicted, would compel the courts to examine the 
basis for the search and seizure in every case.  Yet, in actuality the trend 
seems to be toward narrow and overly strict interpretations of case law as a 
 80. Klein, supra note 77, at 1372. 
 81. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why 
Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges 
Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (2004) (urging replacing “the paradigm of judge as 
passive umpire with the paradigm of judge as active umpire”). 
 82. See, e.g., James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the 
Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1543 (2003).  For more regarding problem-
solving courts see infra notes 99-117 and accompanying text. 
 83. See, e.g., Deborah Pines, Ten Years Later, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Go Down 
Easier; Seen as Allowing Judges More Flexibility than Anticipated, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1997, 
at 1 (“Some of the loudest critics in the early years of the federal sentencing guidelines were 
federal district judges.”).  In fact, some judges have resigned from the bench in a public 
display of their distaste for the federal sentencing guidelines.  See Leonard Post, Irked By 
Sentencing Law Two U.S. Judges Lash Out at “Feeney,” RECORDER, Feb. 13, 2004, at 3. 
 84. See, e.g., John Caher, Backer of Changes in Rockefeller Drug Law Says Judges 
Should Get Off the Sidelines, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 2004, at 1. 
 85. See generally Chin & Wells, supra note 41, 248-50 (noting the prevalence and 
tolerance of police perjury in suppression hearings). 
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means to deny defendants suppression hearings.86
Once a hearing is commenced, it must be viewed as an opportunity to 
discover the truth.  Judges should refrain from sacrificing the truth seeking 
function of the hearing at the altar of judicial expediency and economy.  If 
cross-examination
 
87 is indeed the best method to ascertain the truth,88 then 
courts should refrain from unduly limiting the scope and nature of the 
cross.89  Similarly, the court should demand that the prosecutor call as 
witnesses the police officers most directly involved in the arrest.  
Increasingly, prosecutors are using hearsay upon hearsay to make their 
case.90  This provides another layer of insulation for a corrupt police 
officer.  Finally, the court should be more willing to allow the defense to 
call its own witnesses, including any of the police officers involved with 
the arrest.91
 
 86. See, e.g., People v. Mendoza, 624 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1993).  The court in Mendoza 
addressed the requirements of N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.60 [hereinafter N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW] regarding what the defense must allege in a suppression motion in order to 
merit a hearing.  The Court stated that the factual allegations should be evaluated by the face 
of the pleadings, and assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion and the 
defendant’s access to information.  Mendoza, 624 N.E.2d at 1021.  Commentators have 
observed that trial courts are increasingly applying Mendoza to deny defense motions for 
suppression hearings.  See, e.g., Brooks Holland, Defendants in Possession Cases Face a 
Dilemma in Pleading Standing, N.Y.L.J., June 30, 1999, at 1. 
  Undoubtedly, some of these changes might result in greater 
demands on police time.  The key question is whether the court should be 
most concerned with causing the police officer some degree of 
inconvenience, or with critically examining what occurred.  The Mollen 
 87. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 88. See, e.g., FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION (4th ed. 1948); J. 
Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of 
Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741, 765 (1988) (“[C]ross-
examination is said to be an excellent vehicle for discovering and exposing the falsehoods of 
mendacious witnesses.”).  
 89. For a discussion of the defendant’s right to fully cross-examine the prosecution’s 
witnesses at a suppression hearing, see generally People v. Edwards, 741 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 
2000), and People v. Williamson, 588 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1991). 
 90. The prosecution has the burden of going forward with evidence that shows a 
constitutional basis for the arrest.  See People v. Parris, 632 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1994).  A 
police officer testifying at a suppression hearing can establish probable cause by personal 
knowledge or by information provided by others.  See People v. Washington, 663 N.E.2d 
1253, 1254 (N.Y. 1996); Parris, 632 N.E.2d at 873.  It is not always the case, however, that 
hearsay will suffice.  See, e.g., People v. Ketcham, 712 N.E.2d 1238, 1241-43 (N.Y. 1999); 
People v. Gonzalez, 600 N.E.2d 238, 238-39 (N.Y. 1992). 
 91. See People v. Chipp, 552 N.E.2d 608, 614 (N.Y. 1990) (finding that the right of 
compulsory process at a pretrial hearing regarding the admissibility of identification 
testimony is within the court’s discretion); see also People v. Skinner, 632 N.Y.S.2d 283, 
285 (App. Div. 1995); 
People v. Acquaah, 562 N.Y.S.2d 62, 64 (App. Div. 1990) (“A defendant’s right to call a 
witness at a suppression hearing is not absolute.”). 
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Report and the New York City history of police scandals should answer 
that question easily. 
By turning their focus to the underlying actions of the police, the courts 
will return to the lofty ideals of the exclusionary rule and the critical role of 
the judiciary.  In Weeks v. United States, the Court established the rule 
excluding in a federal prosecution evidence obtained by federal agents in 
violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.92  Subsequently, in 
Mapp v. Ohio, the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states as a 
matter of constitutional law so that evidence obtained in violation of the 
Constitution was inadmissible in a criminal trial in state court.93  Over 
time, the Court has made clear that the exclusionary rule’s “primary 
purpose is to deter unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the 
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”94  Put another way, “Its purpose is to deterto compel respect 
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available wayby 
removing the incentive to disregard it.”95  The logic is 
straightforwardevidence must be suppressed in order to deter the police 
from violating the Constitution.96
If, on the other hand, evidence is virtually never suppressed, illegal 
searches will thrive.  No doubt the findings of the Mollen Commission and 
   
 
 92. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 93. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 94. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); see also Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 235 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (explaining that one 
justification for the exclusionary rule is its role in “exert[ing] general legal pressures to 
secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of federal law-enforcing officers”); 
Daniel S. Schneider, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule and the Development of State 
Constitutional Law, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 377, 384 (1987) (arguing that the exclusionary rule 
is designed to deter police misconduct). 
 95. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
 96. See, e.g., Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. 
Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 
17-18 (2003) (noting that court oversight of police conduct is limited by the number and 
kind of issues considered by courts); see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the courts, and 
then only those where the search and seizure yields incriminating evidence and the 
defendant is at least sufficiently compromised to be indicted.  If the officers raid a 
home, an office, or stop and search an automobile but find nothing incriminating, 
this invasion of the personal liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical 
redress.  There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful searches 
of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn up nothing 
incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about which the courts do nothing, and 
about which we never hear.  Courts can protect the innocent against such 
invasions only indirectly and through the medium of excluding evidence obtained 
against those who frequently are guilty. 
ZIEDMANCHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:01 PM 
2005] POLICING THE POLICE  119 
the New York State Attorney General support that conclusion.  Perhaps 
former Chief Justice Warren Burger put it best, “The rule has rested on a 
theory that suppression of evidence in these cases was imperative to deter 
law enforcement authorities from using improper methods to obtain 
evidence.”97  Burger went on to observe that law enforcement would be 
deterred if the evidence is “suppressed often enough.”98
What do the courts as a whole now do differently?  How have the courts 
changed in the quality-of-life/zero tolerance policing, post-Mollen 
Commission world?  .In the past decade, so-called problem-solving courts 
have begun to dot the judicial landscape.
  Suffice it to say 
that the Criminal Court has long since abandoned this critical role, and we 
all pay the price with the outbreak of every police scandal and/or 
publication of reports detailing stop and frisk abuses on our streets. 
99 Drug treatment courts, domestic 
violence courts, community courts and even commercial courts, have 
evolved from interesting pilot projects to mainstream court 
administration.100  Under the leadership of Chief Judge Judith Kaye, New 
York has assumed the position as the state judiciary most committed to 
reinventing the way its courts do business.101  Problem-solving courts “use 
the coercive authority of the courts to achieve more meaningful case 
outcomes,”102 and “broaden the focus of legal proceedings from fact-
finding and narrow legal issues to changing the future behavior of litigants 
(and the future well-being of communities).”103
 
 97. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 413 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
  Leading proponents of 
problem-solving courts revel in the prospects of “full-scale reform of [the] 
 98. Id. at 415 (emphasis added). 
 99. For a further discussion on problem-solving courts see generally Greg Berman & 
John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Primer, 23 LAW & POL’Y 125 (2001); Judith 
Kaye, Rethinking Traditional Approaches, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1491 (1999); and Bruce J. 
Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1055 (2003). 
 100. Even the Supreme Court is weighing in.  In his speech at the American Bar 
Association’s annual meeting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer urged the development of 
problem-solving courts.  See Molly McDonough, ABA Notes: Breyer on Supreme Civility, 
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 20, 2001, at A15. 
 101. Judge Kaye’s efforts in this regard have received national attention and recognition.  
She was awarded the National Center for State Courts’ 1999 William H. Rehnquist Award 
for Judicial Excellence based on her “innovative, problem-solving approach to justice.”  See 
Today’s News Update, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 10, 1999, at 1.  There are almost thirty problem-
solving courts operating presently in New York City alone.  See Rayner, supra note 1, at 
1049 n.63. 
 102. John Feinblatt, et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 282 (2000). 
 103. Id. 
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state court system.”104  The State’s Chief Administrative Judge speaks of 
“institutionalizing [the] problem-solving approach into the very fabric of 
what we do in the courts on a daily basis.”105
Court innovation is to be commended.  Unquestionably, the age-old way 
of doing business in the Criminal Court was not working on any measure, 
and it is no small accomplishment to reform the culture of the courts.
 
106
Coincidentally, or ironically, the advent of these courts coincides with 
the massive influx of misdemeanor arrests.  Just as misdemeanor cases 
came to dominate the court calendars, problem-solving approaches began 
to permeate judicial attitudes.  As the net widened, and the police arrested 
more peopleprimarily people of colorfor relatively minor 
transgressions, the courts began to change their focus.  We cannot, and 
should not, uncouple the proliferation of problem-solving courts from the 
underlying police activity that brought the accused into court. 
  
Still, the problem-solving court movement must be carefully scrutinized.  
Although imbued with noble goals, it is imperative to ask whether these 
courts actually encourage or discourage a probing, critical examination of 
how the police came to bring the accused under the thumb of the criminal 
justice system in the first place. 
Problem-solving courts seek to promote a mindset of cooperation among 
all the institutional players.  Defense lawyers are urged to shift from a 
litigation-based, adversarial approach to a team-based problem-solving 
ideal.107  Typical of the descriptions of these courts are comments about the 
Red Hook Community Justice Center in Brooklyn, New York: “The 
prosecutor and defense lawyer are part of the same team, working on the 
long-term best interests of individual defendants and the community.”108
Proponents of problem-solving courts and its teamwork emphasis aver 
that the adversarial system is not working.  It is more accurate, however, to 
note that the Criminal Court is not, and has never been, adversarial.  Ever 
since Gideon v. Wainwright
 
109
 
 104. Feinblatt, supra note 102, at 279-80. 
 spawned the development of public 
 105. John Caher, $1.14 Billion Budget Proposed By Judiciary; 3.4% Increase Sought in 
Court Spending, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 2, 1999, at 5 (quoting New York’s Chief Administrative 
Judge Jonathan Lippman). 
 106. See, e.g., MALCOLM C. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS 
FAIL (1983) (evaluating various means of court reform). 
 107. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Lawyering for a New Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5 
(1998); Nolan, supra note 82, at 1543; see generally Drug Courts Program Office, Office of 
Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Defining Drug Courts: The Key Components, 1997, 
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/bja/define/welcome.html. 
 108. Terry Carter, Red Hook Experiment, 90 A.B.A. J. 36, 39 (June 2004). 
 109. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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defender offices across the country, commentators have detailed the 
widespread deficiencies of many indigent defense providers.110  Whether 
due to staggering caseloads, institutional pressures, organizational 
cooptation, or bureaucratic allegiances to other players in the court system, 
the proclivities of indigent defense attorneys to plead out their clients are 
well-documented.111  Although the Criminal Court has been fraught with 
problems, an overabundance of adversarialness is not one of them.  As one 
scholar observed, “the American system as it actually operates in most 
cases looks much more like what common lawyers would describe as a 
non-adversarial, administrative system of justice than like the adversarial 
model they idealize.”112
Other commentators believe that by abandoning even the semblance of 
the adversarial system, and in so doing pushing aside concerns of probable 
cause and culpability, problem-solving courts inappropriately fast forward 
to sentencing.
  In this day and age, what we actually need to 
develop is a true, full-scale adversarial system where hearings and trials are 
the norm. 
113  Particularly troubling are those courts that encourage 
defendants, implicitly or explicitly, to plead guilty early in the 
proceedings.114
 
 110. See, e.g., ROBERT HERMANN ET AL., COUNSEL FOR THE POOR: CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN 
URBAN AMERICA (1977); Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of 
the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581 (1986-87). 
  The result is a system exactly the opposite of one that 
 111. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 
YALE L.J. 1179, 1182 (1975); Abraham Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence 
Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, LAW & SOC’Y REV., June 1967, at 18; 
Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the 
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 656-
75 (1986); David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a 
Public Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255, 256, 258-59 (1965). 
 112. Lynch, supra note 74, at 2118. 
 113. See, e.g., Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, “From Day One”: Who’s in Control as 
Problem Solving and Client-Centered Sentencing Take Center Stage?, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 11, 28 (2004) (“These specialized courts are essentially extended sentencing 
courts designed to support ongoing relationships and monitoring of the offender by a judge 
and professional service providers who work for the court.”); Jane M. Spinak, Why 
Defenders Feel Defensive: The Defender’s Role in Problem-Solving Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1617, 1623 (2003) (“[T]here needs to be a more thorough analysis of when the 
clients’ due process rights are appropriately incorporated into the problem-solving court 
rather than assuming these rights get in the way of achieving good outcomes for clients.”). 
 114. See Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 113, at 30; Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court 
Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1533 (2000) (“In their mad rush to dispose of cases, drug 
courts are risking the due process rights of defendants and turning all of usjudges, staff, 
prosecutors, and public defenders alikeinto cogs in an out-of-control case-processing 
machine.”); Spinak, supra note 113, at 1620 (regarding the “current trend in drug court 
procedure of requiring a guilty plea or waiver of other due process rights as a condition of 
entering treatment, rather than permitting the defendant to begin treatment without entering 
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encourages a probing examination of the underlying arrest and the 
accused’s culpability.115  Instead, problem-solving courts focus on 
treatment, usually part of sentencing discussions.  At best, you end up with 
a system of misplaced, though perhaps well-intentioned, social service 
programs grafted onto people, many of whom probably really did not need 
to be in the Criminal Court in the first place.116
Whose problems do these courts purport to solve?  The courts’?  The 
prosecution’s?  Law enforcement’s?  Society’s?  The defendants’?  And, 
what is the problem they purport to solve?  Recidivism?  Public safety?  
Public perceptions about the courts and justice?  Public perceptions about, 
and fear of, crime?  Court efficiency in the face of huge caseloads?  
Alcohol and drug abuse?  These are obvious and vital questions for any 
discussion about problem-solving courts.
 
117  If the courts are concerned 
primarily with the defendant and his “problems,” then we must ask what 
sort of therapeutic value is added by the problem-solving court.  Well 
before terms like problem-solving courts and therapeutic jurisprudence 
came into the vernacular, scholars found that defendants cared about more 
than the outcomes of their cases.  To the surprise of some, it turned out that 
defendants also cared deeply about the process and whether they were 
treated fairly.118  In fact, many suggested that treating defendants fairly 
increased the chances that they would avoid future misconduct.119
 
a plea”).  But see John Feinblatt et al., The Future of Problem-Solving Courts, 15 CT. 
MANAGER 28, 33 (2000) (suggesting that some problem-solving courts have procedures that 
“improve upon the current climate of coercion”). 
 
 115. John Feinblatt & Derek Denckla, What Does it Mean to be a Good Lawyer? 
Prosecutors, Defenders and Problem-Solving Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 206, 209 (Jan./Feb. 
2001) (“In problem-solving courts, the criminal justice system is consciously shifting 
resources out of the process of adjudicating legal guilt and innocence and into treatment 
services because we don’t want to spend so much time playing adversarial games if 
defendants are going to end up pleading guilty anyway.”). 
 116. See Nolan, supra note 82, at 1541 (supporters of problem-solving courts “argue that 
the need for legal change is heightened by the failure of traditional institutions to handle a 
growing number of social problems”). 
 117. One commentator suggests that problem-solving courts seek to address “the 
underlying problems of individual litigants, the structural problems of the justice system, 
and the social problems of the communities.”  Greg Berman, What is a Traditional Judge 
Anyway? Problem Solving in the State Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 78 (2000). 
 118. See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); Jonathan D. Casper, Having Their Day in Court: 
Defendant Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237 
(1978); Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of Their 
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51 (1984). 
 119. See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact of 
Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 899 n.178 (1996); 
Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & 
JUST. 283, 297 (2003) (stating that “procedural justice is a key antecedent of long-term 
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The defendants’ feelings of unfairness did not have to do with whether 
they were treated therapeutically or whether their problems were solved.  
Rather, defendants clamored for what boils down to basic due process.  
They wanted an advocate to fight for their rights, and for a judge to give 
them their day in court.  Defendants voiced particular concerns about their 
lawyers.  So-called consumer perspective studies consistently reflect 
complaints that lawyers failed to provide advice or counsel.120  Instead, 
countless defendants stated that their lawyers simply urged them, 
vociferously, to plead guilty.121  Defendants wanted, not surprisingly, an 
advocate; a lawyer who would fight to enforce their rights.  If we truly 
cared about therapeutic value to the accused of court proceedings, we 
would strive mightily to ensure that every defendant felt like he had his day 
in court and that all his rights were protected.  Those do not seem to be 
high priority goals of the problem-solving courts.122
While problem-solving may well be therapeutic for the community, and 
even the accused, does it address concerns about innocence, racially 
motivated arrests, and police falsifications?  Shouldn’t courts be 
investigating more cases?  Shouldn’t courts be holding more suppression 
hearings and more trials?  Instead, it seems that problem-solving courts, 
with their emphasis on sentencing and treatment, further imbed a culture of 
pleas and blind faith in police activity.  By focusing on “helping” the 
accused, and often “demanding” guilty pleas in the process, these courts 
serve ironically to better insulate police falsifications from ever coming to 
the surface. 
 
The Mollen Commission’s second category of police falsification is 
 
compliance”). 
 120. See, e.g., Zeidman, supra note 78, at 873 n.200. 
 121. See, e.g., JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICETHE DEFENDANT’S 
PERSPECTIVE 106 (1972) (“Most of the men reported that among the first words uttered by 
their public defender were: ‘I can get you [X] if you plead guilty.’”); Alan F. Arcuri, 
Lawyers, Judges, and Plea Bargaining: Some New Data on Inmates’ Views, 4 INT’L J. 
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 177, 183 (1976) (defendants “reported that they were pressured 
into pleading guilty”); Glen Wilkerson, Public Defenders as Their Clients See Them, 1 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 141, 143 (1972) (“[R]eal or imagined pressure to plead guilty is a frequent 
complaint of defender clients.”).   
 122. See, e.g., Richard Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court 
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1255 (1998) (defendants who agree to participate in 
treatment court “effectively forego the presumption of innocence and the panoply of trial 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution”); Nolan, supra note 82, at 1559.  
In fact, drug court clients typically sign forms waiving a host of constitutional 
rights in order to participate in a drug court, including the right to trial by jury, the 
right to a speedy trial, the right to a preliminary hearing, and the requirement of 
probable cause for a search and seizure.  
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called “documentary perjury”where an officer swears falsely under oath 
in an affidavit or criminal complaint.123  Once again, police engage in this 
form of corruption because they know they can, and do, get away with it.  
In 2004, more than 190,000 people were arrested on misdemeanor charges 
in New York City.124  For sure, the overwhelming majority were people of 
color.125
In People v. Dumas,
  Factor in growing concerns about innocence and the ever present 
specter of police corruption and it becomes clear that judges must 
meaningfully review the pleadings as early as possible. 
126 the Court of Appeals of New York stressed that a 
misdemeanor complaint must allege “facts of an evidentiary character”127 
demonstrating “reasonable cause” to believe the accused committed the 
crime charged.128  The complaints at issue contained merely conclusory 
statements and were dismissed as facially insufficient.  The court 
emphasized the critical nature of the reasonable cause determination by 
pointing out that a misdemeanor complaint can serve as the basis for an 
arrest warrant, and is designed to provide the court with sufficient facts to 
decide whether the accused should be held for further proceedings.129
Just one year later, the court applied the logic of Dumas to 
“informations.”
  
Given the consequences that can flow from a misdemeanor complaint, it is 
entirely appropriate that it be comprised of evidentiary facts instead of 
conclusory statements. 
130  The court held that an information must demonstrate 
both “reasonable cause” and a legally sufficient or prima facie case.131  As 
revealed by Judge Bellacosa in his concurring opinion, the court was well 
aware of the impact of its holding and the “practicalities encountered in 
prosecuting the relatively greater numbers of these relatively less serious 
crimes,”132 but the need for specific factual allegations was seen as 
necessary “so that such prosecutions do not become routinized or treated by 
anyone as insignificant or unimportant.”133
 
 123. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 36. 
  Amazingly, the call for 
 124. CITE – I RECEIVED THIS NUMBER VIA EMAIL TO AUTHOR FROM NYS DIVISION OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES (DCJS) 
 125. See, e.g., CJA Research Brief, supra note 6, at 4 (eighty-four percent of those 
arrested for non-felonies in 1998 were African-American or Latino). 
 126. 497 N.E.2d 686 (N.Y. 1986). 
 127. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15(3) (McKinney 2005). 
 128. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(4)(b). 
 129. Dumas, 497 N.E.2d at 687. 
 130. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15. 
 131. People v. Alejandro, 511 N.E.2d 71, 73 (N.Y. 1987). 
 132. Id. at 75. 
 133. Id. 
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accusatory instruments with evidentiary facts has simply spawned a slew of 
accusatory instruments containing remarkably similar, canned language.  
This is evidenced by complaints charging misdemeanor drug possession in 
New York City courts,134  often with similar concluding paragraphs 
extolling the officer’s experience and training regarding narcotics, 
regardless of whether it is the officer’s first or one-hundredth drug case.  
Judges must avoid lapsing into perfunctory review of sufficiency and 
reasonable cause, and their critical scrutiny of the accusatory instrument 
should take place at the arraignment.135
Falsifying records, primarily police reports, is the third category of 
police falsification.
 
136  The judiciary can best police this form of corruption 
by monitoring discovery practice.137  The criminal discovery procedure 
embodied in Article 240 was enacted almost twenty-five years ago, and 
was intended to promote the greater, freer, and earlier exchange of 
information between the parties.138  As the court stated in People v. 
Copicotto,139
evinces a legislative determination that the trial of a criminal charge 
 the discovery statute  
 
 134. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.03 (McKinney 2003). 
 135. While many judges decline to hear oral sufficiency challenges at arraignments, it 
seems apparent that, not only should they entertain such motions, they are in fact obligated 
to do so.  See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.45; People v. Hernandez, 770 N.E.2d 566, 566 
(N.Y. 2002); People v. Machado, 698 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419 (Crim. Ct. 1999).  The 
Constitution mandates that a reasonable cause determination be made by a judge “promptly” 
after a defendant has been arrested without a warrant.  Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 
(1975); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.20 (persons arrested must be arraigned 
without unnecessary delay); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55-57 (1991) 
(a probable cause determination coupled with arraignment must generally take place within 
forty-eight hours of arrest); People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 568 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (App. 
Div. 1990), aff’d, 77 N.Y.2d 422 (1991) (a delay of more than twenty-four hours between 
arrest and arraignment is presumptively unreasonable). 
 136. Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 36. 
 137. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20.  Since there is no constitutional right to pretrial 
discovery, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), public policy considerations figure 
prominently.  New York also statutorily prescribes a practice for bills of particular.  N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.95.  According to the practice commentaries,  
[t]he function of a bill of particulars is to “define more specifically the crime or 
crimes charged . . . or, in other words, to provide clarification” by furnishing 
information as to the substance of the factual allegations.  Thus its office is to give 
the defendant information regarding the circumstances underlying the accusation, 
or its context, so that the defendant understands precisely what it is he or she is to 
defend against.   
Peter Preiser, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.95, Practice Commentaries. 
 138. See, e.g., James A. Yates, Discovery Provision is Misunderstood, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 
2003, at 2 (“As one of the principals involved in the drafting of Article 240, I feel compelled 
to point out that Article 240 was intended to advance, not restrict, discovery.”). 
 139. 406 N.E.2d 465, 468 (N.Y. 1980). 
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should not be a sporting event where each side remains ignorant of facts 
in the hands of the adversary until events unfold at trial.  Broader pretrial 
discovery enables the defendant to make a more informed plea decision, 
minimizes the tactical and often unfair advantage to one side, and 
increases to some degree the opportunity for an accurate determination of 
guilt or innocence.140
Discovery has evolved into a series of form filings, responses, and 
decisions.  Judges should invest in discovery so that it meets its lofty ideals 
as to what must be turned over,
   
141 when it must be turned over,142 and 
sanctions against the prosecutor for failing to turn it over.143
The judiciary has at its disposal several other mechanisms to help detect 
falsifications in police reports.  In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court 
held that a criminal defendant has a due process right to disclosure of 
evidence favorable to him and material to guilt or punishment.
 
144  New 
York courts have often found greater protection for defendants on Brady-
related claims than that granted by the federal courts.145  Subpoenas 
provide another avenue for prying loose police reports that might contain 
lies.146  While there is no constitutional right to subpoena government 
documents,147 trial judges do indeed have the discretionary authority to 
issue subpoenas duces tecum.148
 
 140. Id. 
  New York’s Freedom of Information Law 
(“FOIL”) was enacted to provide the public with access to government 
 141. See, e.g., Yates, supra note 138 (discussing the court’s discretionary authority to 
order discovery). 
 142. See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 63, at 792 (“[J]udges often allow prosecutors to skirt 
their responsibility to turn over timely discovery . . . .”). 
 143. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40.  See BRAD MIDDLEKAUFF, CRIMINAL DISCOVERY IN 
NEW YORK STATE: A REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY CODES COMMITTEE 58 
(1992) (discussing, inter alia, the use of sanctions for discovery violations).  Inadequate 
pretrial discovery has many other adverse consequences.  See e.g., Jenny Roberts, Too 
Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial 
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097 (2004) (discussing how 
insufficient discovery, and the corresponding inability to fully investigate, leads to 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 144. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972). 
 145. See Abraham Abramovsky, Pretrial ‘Brady’ Disclosure in N.Y., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 30, 
2001, at 3 (regarding New York courts finding greater rights for defendants with respect to 
the timing and scope of Brady disclosures); see also People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 919 
(N.Y. 1990); People v. Novoa, 517 N.E.2d 219, 223 (N.Y. 1987). 
 146. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 610. 
 147. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987). 
 148. See, e.g., People v. Bagley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (App. Div. 2001) (finding that 
the defendant must provide a factual predicate that the documents sought would bear 
relevant and exculpatory evidence); Yates, supra note 138. 
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records.149  While the applicability of FOIL to pending criminal cases has 
generated much debate and litigation, the time is ripe for judges to 
reconsider FOIL requests as appropriate in particular cases.150
The usual objection to expanded discovery devices is administrative.  
The police department, in particular, objects that it cannot function under 
the weight of too many subpoenas and FOIL requests.
 
151
The prosecutor’s special role is supposedly to seek justice, not merely 
convictions.
  Should the courts 
be more concerned with police department complaints about a plethora of 
paperwork, or with making sure that every litigated case is free from 
corruption?  Again, the Mollen Commission and the history of police 
scandals speak directly to that question.  How better to track down 
falsifications in police reports than by making them available to the defense 
and the subject of thorough and probing cross-examination? 
152  Where was, and is, the prosecutor in this tale of rampant 
police falsification?  How do prosecutors identify police perjury?  What do 
they do when a police officer is found to be incredible?  The fact is, a 
subsequent prosecution for perjury is altogether rare.153  The anecdotal 
evidence suggests that prosecutors often ignore manifestations of police 
corruption.154
Officers and their immediate supervisors are not the only culprits in 
tolerating falsifications . . . the Department’s top commanders must share 
  In the course of ascribing blame and fault for flourishing 
police falsifications, the Mollen Commission added,  
 
 149. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 et seq. (McKinney 1988).  For illustrative purposes see 
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994). 
 150. See, e.g., Legal Aid Soc’y v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 713 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (App. Div. 
2000); Gould v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 675 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1996) (finding that the 
police department’s “complaint follow-up report” was not entitled to blanket protection 
under one of FOIL’s enumerated exemptions). 
 151. See  Jeremy Travis & Thomas P. Doepfner, Using Subpoenas to Obtain Police 
Records, N.Y.L.J., May 21, 1993, at 1 (discussing the costs to the police department of 
judicial subpoenas duces tecum). 
 152. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Mental Culpability and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 
26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 121, 129 n.17 (1998); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek 
Justice,” 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 643 (1999). 
 153. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 40, at 1313 (“Occasionally police officers are 
prosecuted for perjury, and from time to time they are punished.  These cases are unusual, 
however, and undoubtedly represent only a fraction of the cases in which perjury has 
occurred.”); Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596 (“The 
policeman is as likely to be indicted for perjury by his co-worker, the prosecutor, as he is to 
be struck down by thunderbolts from an avenging heaven.”). 
 154. The Mollen Commission reported about a practice referred to as “collars-for-
dollars.”  Mollen Report, supra note 29, at 39.  This scheme involved officers making 
unlawful arrests timed conveniently to generate overtime pay for the arresting officer.  Id.  
According to the Commission, this practice was “widely known to officers, police 
supervisors, and prosecutors alike.”  Id. 
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the blame.  Members of the law enforcement community, and particularly 
defense attorneys, told us that this same tolerance is sometimes exhibited 
among prosecutors.  Indeed, several former and current prosecutors 
acknowledged“off the record”that perjury and falsifications are 
serious problems in law enforcement that, though not condoned, are 
ignored.155
How did the District Attorneys respond to the knowledge that they were 
apparently regularly played like fools, or worse, exposed?  When the nature 
and extent of police falsifications began to surface, the District Attorney of 
Brooklyn called the problem “significant,” and his counterpart in Queens 
termed it “terribly troublesome.”
 
156  What sort of post-hoc grand rounds 
did they engage in to see how they missed all the testilying, reportilying, 
and related falsifications?  What do they now do differently as a result? 157
These are critical questions.  The prosecutor, after all, serves as the 
frontline or the gatekeeper to the criminal court.  It is the prosecutor who 
interviews the arresting officer and decides whether to initiate criminal 
proceedings.
  
How have they incorporated the lessons of the Mollen Commission into 
their training about police credibility and the need for prosecutors to 
critically, and even skeptically, evaluate police officers’ accounts of 
arrests? 
158  The prosecutor’s decision to file a criminal court 
accusatory instrument represents some form of vouching for the arresting 
officer.  Their ability, and willingness,159 to carefully and accurately 
discern truth and ferret out lies is of paramount concern.160  Yet, 
administrative changes over the years have served to distance prosecutors 
from arresting officers, thereby making it that much harder to assess 
credibility.  It was once standard practice for the arresting officer to be 
interviewed by a prosecutor in-person shortly after the arrest.  Today, more 
and more, the interview is conducted over the phone or through 
videoconferencing.161
 
 155. Id. at 41-42. 
  As a result, the possibility of being trained to look 
 156. Sexton, supra note 71. 
 157. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police 
Abuse: The Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 305, 308 (2001) (discussing 
what the prosecutors could have done to better prevent the police scandal in Los Angeles, 
and what they should do in the future to prevent such abuses). 
 158. Id. at 305 (“Prosecutors are thus in a unique role to oversee and monitor the conduct 
of the police.”). 
 159. Id. at 310 (addressing the reluctance of some prosecutors to challenge police 
officers’ accounts of the arrest). 
 160. Id. at 316 (arguing that prosecutors have a responsibility to “question and evaluate” 
police officers’ credibility, especially since so many cases are resolved without a trial). 
 161. See, e.g., Bill Farrell, A New Arrest Process, DAILY NEWS, Dec. 7, 1995, at 2; 
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for so-called telltale signs of lying (i.e., shifting in the seat; averting one’s 
eyes; etc.) is rendered meaningless.162
Other actions by prosecutors have the effect of making it harder, rather 
than easier, to detect police falsification.  The New York State District 
Attorney’s Association, in conjunction with the New York State Law 
Enforcement Council (“LEC”), has labored mightily to restrict the flow of 
information to the defense.  As discussed above, New York’s Freedom of 
Information Law provides public access to government records.
 
163  The 
LEC has supported legislation that exempts law enforcement agency 
records relating to pending criminal cases from FOIL.164  If passed, this 
legislation would close a potential path to the discovery of police 
falsification.  In People v. Ranghelle, the Court of Appeals held that 
reversal was the appropriate remedy whenever the prosecution failed to 
disclose any prior statements of a witness who testified at trial.165  The 
LEC steadfastly and aggressively advocated for the legislation that 
overruled Ranghelle by removing the automatic reversal remedy and 
substituting a harmless error analysis.166
 
Joseph P. Fried, TV Speeds Cases From Police to Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1995, at 
B4 (“[v]ideo teleconferencing is about efficiency, processing arrests and returning police 
officers to the street as quickly as possible,” quoting then Police Commissioner William J. 
Bratton); Bob Kappstatter, BLAP! Bronx Cops Fight Time, DAILY NEWS, July 21, 1995, at 2; 
Leonard Rubin, PC-Based Video Provides More Bang for the Buck, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 1995, 
at S2; Chuck Sudetic, Plan Streamlines Booking in 14 Brooklyn Precincts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 14, 1995, at B2 (“[w]e all used to think you had to see a police officer and a victim 
sitting across a table,” quoting an assistant district attorney). 
   
 162. This is but another example of the ways the Criminal Court emphasizes efficiency at 
the expense of truthseeking.  Not that long ago, the arresting officer had to speak with a 
prosecutor face-to-face, and also had to appear in court at the arraignment.  See, e.g., E.R. 
Shipp, Prearraignment System to be Used by Morgenthau, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1982, at 32.  
In both situations, the officer was subject to being questioned about the circumstances 
surrounding the arrest.  Id.  As we move closer to a form of virtual justice, the arresting 
officer becomes increasingly insulated from any meaningful questioning about his or her 
behavior.  In similar fashion, “[m]ost assistant district attorneys do not appear in court to 
‘cover’ their cases; rather the day’s docket is handled by ADAs assigned to a courtroom part 
who rely on written instructions provided by the ADA assigned to each respective part.”  
Rayner, supra note 1, at 1063 n.81.  This practice of prosecution by note often deprives the 
court and defense counsel of vital information during case conferences, and also distances 
the prosecutor from the accused; it is not uncommon for a prosecutor to never actually see 
the person she is prosecuting. 
 163. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. 
 164. N.Y. State Law Enforcement Council, 1998 Legislative Priorities 37 (1998). 
 165. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 240.44, 240.45 (McKinney 2005); 503 N.E.2d 1011 
(N.Y. 1986); see Mark M. Baker, The ‘Rosario’ Per Se Rule: Rest in Peace, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 
14, 2001, at 1 (automatic reversal was the remedy if the prosecutor failed to disclose prior 
statements, memoranda, or other materials in their possession relating to the subject matter 
of the witness’s testimony).  
 166. See, e.g., Charles J. Hynes, Open Discovery Law Seen as Separate Issue, N.Y.L.J., 
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Putting aside the question of whether the Ranghelle rule did in fact result 
in many reversals, it is important to examine the impact of the rule.  Given 
the fear of an automatic reversal, one would imagine that prosecutors were 
more diligent than ever before to track down and disclose every document 
connected to the case.  What better way to uncover the existence of 
falsified reports?  The prosecutors took a similar tack with respect to 
subpoenas, and joined with the police department in a concerted effort to 
reduce the numbers of judicial subpoenas duces tecum.167
Prosecutors must also reconsider the role of the guilty plea.  Policies or 
practices that effectively punish defendants for litigating suppression 
issues, and/or culpability, result in overwhelming numbers of guilty 
pleas.
  As a result of 
these policies, police reports remain buried, far away from the light of day. 
168
One commentator argues that the ethical lens has been pointed at the 
defense bar for too long, and he advocates turning it in the direction of the 
prosecution.
  These pleas, in turn, result in unchecked, unmonitored police 
activity.  As part of their justice-seeking function, prosecutors should 
endeavor to expose police actions to scrutiny from judges and juries. 
169  Others suggest, similarly, that it is appropriate to demand 
greater ethical conduct from prosecutors.170  As one leading authority 
stated, as “a minister of justice to protect innocent persons from wrongful 
convictions,” the prosecutor has “a duty to make an independent evaluation 
of the credibility of his witnesses, the reliability of forensic evidence, and 
the truth of the defendant’s guilt” beyond that mandated by the ethical 
rules.171  To date, prosecutors have been relatively free from oversight or 
critical review.172  There are very few cases where disciplinary authorities 
have sanctioned prosecutors.173
 
Apr. 16, 1996, at 2 (“For the past eight years the District Attorneys’ Association has sought 
legislation to overrule the decision[s] in People v. Ranghelle . . . failure to turn over any 
prior written or recorded statement of a witness at trial is per se reversible error.”).  In 2000, 
the legislature eliminated the so-called Ranghelle rule.  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.75 
(effective 2/1/01). 
  It is also rare for appellate courts to 
 167. See Travis & Doepfner, supra note 151 (“Over the past few years, the [police] 
department has pursued an aggressive litigation program, in cooperation with the District 
Attorney’s offices, in an attempt to reduce the number of inappropriately issued 
subpoenas.”). 
 168. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.  Judges also use the threat of a higher 
sentence to disincline defendants from litigating their cases.  Id. 
 169. Dershowitz, supra note 40. 
 170. Green, supra note 69. 
 171. Gershman, supra note 69, at 337. 
 172. Gary C. Williams, The Rampart Scandal: Policing the Criminal Justice System; 
Incubating Monsters?: Prosecutorial Responsibility for the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 829, 837 n.44 (2001). 
 173. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 454 
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reverse convictions based on prosecutorial misconduct.174  Apparently, 
prosecutors are also rarely disciplined within their own offices, even when 
an appellate court has found that they withheld exculpatory evidence.175
It seems to be the case that prosecutors, as well as judges, are not simply 
oblivious to police falsifications.  Rather, they are also too willing to turn a 
blind eye in that direction.  As one commentator asked rhetorically, “Is it 
possible that hundreds of thousands of transparent cases of police perjury 
are occurring every year in the courts of this country without prosecutors 
and judges knowing about it, and even encouraging it?  I don’t think so.”
 
176  
If indeed those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it,177
 
 
then the Criminal Court must address the recurring, systemic problem of 
police falsification quickly.  After all, we are already ten years into the next 
cycle. 
 
(1992); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 
722 (2001). 
 174. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 862 (1995) 
(“The prosecutor’s [exercise of discretion] is effectively unreviewable by courts.”). 
 175. See, e.g., Andrea Elliott, Prosecutors Not Penalized, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
17, 2003, at B1; Andrea Elliott & Benjamin Weiser, When Prosecutors Err, Others Pay the 
Price; Disciplinary Action is Rare After Misconduct or Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
2004, at 25. 
 176. Dershowitz, supra note 40, at 17; see Slobogin, supra note 39, at 1046 (referring to 
a study finding “stunning evidence of prosecutorial and judicial nonchalance”); Chase, 
supra note 40, at 775 (stating need to “encourage prosecutors and judges to be more critical 
in their evaluation of police officer accounts of their criminal investigations”). 
 177. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON: INTRODUCTION AND REASON IN COMMON 
SENSE 284 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 2d ed. 1936) (1905) (“Those who cannot remember the 
past are condemned to repeat it.”). 
